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Introduction
There are a few moments in life when a crossroads is reached, necessitating a fundamental 
choice about the course to follow. Any decisions made at that juncture will have a decisive 
impact upon the future, for better or for worse. The EU is at such a point in its external 
action. The international order is being fundamentally reshaped by the emergence of 
influential actors (the BRIC countries are often automatically, and uncritically, mentioned 
in  this  regard)  but  also  by  influential  non-state  actors  who  act  across  borders  and 
continents1. The exact nature of the emerging international system is far from clear – for 
some it is a complex multipolar system with different influences in particular policy areas 
or regions, but with no obvious hegemon; for others this looks suspiciously like a ‘non-
polar’ world promising disarray and potential competition (especially for resources)2.
The EU’s ‘actomess’
The EU is in the throes of trying to establish its role in the developing international 
system, both at the macro level (trying to work out what Herman Van Rompuy’s ‘economic 
governance’ really means) as well as at the levels of strategic partnerships (commencing 
with the EU’s relations with China, Russia and the United States)3. Against this changing 
backdrop, the EU has the task of defining its role and identity – or as political scientists 
say, the nature of its ‘actorness’. The mercury disputes last June, where the Council and 
the Commission split over the question of who should represent the Union in cases 
where there are shared competences, and the September deferment of a vote on a 
draft resolution that would have given the enhanced observer status in the UN General 
Assembly, are symptomatic of the difficulties of defining the EU’s role and status as an 
actor on the international scene4.
Black swans
The shaping of the international system is also influenced by ‘black swans’ – events that 
no one predicted and thus prepared for and where there is the risk of overestimating 
knowledge about the event and its potential impact5. The emergence of the internet and 
its profound effect on international politics is an obvious example. The dramatic and still 
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unfinished foment in parts of North Africa and the Middle East is another, more salient, 
example. Officials and experts likewise did not predict these events, nor have the full 
implications been fully understood.
... and Lisbon
The third important development was heralded by the Lisbon Treaty and, in particular, 
the slow and still painful emergence of the European External Action Service (EEAS). 
The introduction of a High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who is 
also a Vice President in the Commission, holds the promise of more coherence (and less 
squabbling) between the EU institutions. The recognition of the EU’s international legal 
personality and, most notably, the advent of Union delegations, open up the possibility 
for the EU to engage in far broader dialogues – now formally incorporating foreign and 
security elements alongside the former communautaire elements. The centralisation of 
geographical desks in the EEAS, the creation of multilateral and thematic desks, alongside 
the advent of the Union delegations, all demand a more strategic approach to the EU’s 
external action. The EEAS may, in time, emerge as a quasi corps diplomatique for the EU, 
but it remains early days and it will take several years to iron the kinks out of the Service. 
In an obliging international system the stop button would be activated while the EU sorts 
itself out. But the world moves on. 
‘The vision question’
Since the EU is itself in transition, it remains difficult for the Union 
to assume a pro-active role at a time when its fundamental aims 
and purpose on the international stage are open to debate. The 
EU lacks any compelling vision to guide its overall purpose, 
identity and direction in external action, although this is not for 
want of a plethora of disjointed strategies. An obvious starting 
point is the Lisbon Treaty itself which makes it clear that the 
EU’s external actions are supposed to be based on values and 
interests.  This  is  easily  written  although  formidably  difficult 
to accomplish, but this does not exculpate the Union and its 
members from trying.  
Currently,  the  EU  sends  out  mixed  messages  regarding  the  balance  between  values 
(human rights, democracy and the rule of law) and the pursuit of (common) interests.   
In some cases the EU’s interests tip clearly in favour of more pragmatic considerations 
(like energy security) and, in those cases where the EU enjoys greater leverage, such as its 
relations with the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific countries, values appear more to the fore 
in the form of ‘essential elements’ clauses. It would be an exaggeration to claim that the 
EU does not attempt to introduce values-based, or normative, elements into its external 
action, but the manner in which it has done so leaves the EU vulnerable to charges of 
double standards; none more so than in its relations with the southern neighbourhood.
Lessons from the Arab spring
The  foment  in  Bahrain,  Egypt,  Libya,  Syria  and  Tunisia  are  stark  reminders  of  why 
the question of values and principles should not assume the back seat to energy and 
trade agreements, or other more pragmatic considerations. The EU will soon face a 
generation of young Arabs, some of whom will assume positions of responsibility in the 
new administrations throughout the region. They, in turn, will reflect upon the nature 
of the EU’s agreements with the previous autocratic regimes and where the Union was, 
alongside other actors, in their hour of need. Salient questions will be posed about the 
application of the EU’s cherished principles (these are listed as liberty, democracy, respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law). Such questions may, 
with equal validity, be posed by young Georgians. 
The confluence of these three elements – the changing international system, the changes 
introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, and the changes in the EU’s neighbourhood – provide 
formidable challenges but may also represent a window of opportunity. It is time for the 
EU to be clearer about what type of actor it wishes to become and what paths it will 
pursue to reinforce what the EU itself claims is a ‘distinctive European approach to foreign 
and security policy6’.
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Responding to change
In response to these three challenges, the EU should consider the following:
1.  A  Strategic  Concept:  The  EU  should  adopt  a  strategic  concept  outlining  the 
  fundamental role envisaged for the Union in the years ahead (until, for example,   
  2030).  As  noted,  the  beginnings  of  such  a  broad  dialogue  have  already  begun,   
  prompted by Van Rompuy’s important speech at the College d’Europe in February   
  2010 and a number thereafter. The concept should though be generated from the   
  EU  itself,  so  that  ownership  is  assured,  and  then  approved  by  the  members.   
It should also tie together and prioritise 
existing  geographical  and  thematic 
strategies.  In  practical  terms  this 
means  moving  beyond  the  somewhat 
lacklustre  discussions  on  China,  Russia 
and the United States (among others), to 
identify core priorities and to link these 
to the broad array of sectoral dialogues 
represented  in  each  of  these  cases.   
  In spite of the voguish obsession with the BRICs, and especially ascendant China,   
  no strategic partnership is more important to the EU than that with the United States,   
  which still remains a fundamentally unbalanced relationship. On the one hand there   
  is unparalleled cooperation (and competition) when it comes to economic and trade   
  issues, as well as in critical areas of mutual interest like counter-terrorism; but on the   
  other hand, foreign and security relations are clouded in mutual ambivalence, most   
  notably where relations with NATO are concerned. It is high time to frame the EU’s   
  interests with, if need be, more independence from the United States but only when   
  matched  by  the  political  will  and  capacity  to  act.  Any  new  and  more  balanced   
  transatlantic dialogue is only possible under this condition.
  In its relations with other strategic partners (a term which itself lacks much substance   
  or clarity), such as China, the EU needs a firmer idea of its key interests, the objectives   
  of its partners, as well as the values and principles that the Union represents. Aside   
  from the important role of the European Council, the EEAS should develop much of   
  the  detailed  conceptual  work  along  with  the  relevant  parts  of  the  Commission.   
  Indeed, in the EEAS context the multilateral and geographical desks all require strategic   
  parameters within which to operate. It is also difficult to understand the rationale   
  behind  the  offices  for  Public  Diplomacy,  Strategic  Planning  and  Strategic   
  Communication in the absence of an guiding strategic concept. Any such agreed   
  concept must, as a sine qua non, be supported by the Member States in their bilateral   
  diplomacy;
2.  Public diplomacy:  Strategy and vision have to be harnessed to diplomacy (including 
  that at the European level) as well as to public diplomacy, in order for the EU to exert its   
  influence  most  effectively  (see  Aurélie  Courtier’s  contribution).  One  of  the  more   
  obvious weaknesses of the EU in this regard is the weakness of its public diplomacy in   
  external relations. The EU should take public diplomacy far more seriously than it   
  does and invest more personnel and resources towards this end (notwithstanding the   
  confines of ‘budget neutrality’ of the EEAS). Much of what passes for public diplomacy   
  in EU external relations is, in fact, disseminating information. Public diplomacy is,   
  however, about establishing long-term dialogues with diverse groups – stretching   
  beyond the official channels at governmental and official level. This also implies the   
  ability to listen as well as to communicate. Effective public diplomacy is essential for   
  acceptance  of  the  EU’s  role  and  to  the  tailoring  of  the  Union’s  activities  to  the   
  specific locale in which it operates. This obviously has an equally important internal   
  self-reaffirming  aspect  since  the  EU’s  role  in  the  world  also  informs  the  internal   
  identity of the Union. The influx of national diplomats into the EEAS, who bring with   
  them often useful experience and knowledge in this domain, could  be capitalised   
  upon. More specifically, a number of programmes already exist to promote people- 
  to-people contacts and these might usefully be harnessed and expanded within the   
  framework of greatly enhanced EU public diplomacy;
3.  Rebuilding  the  Neighbourhood:  As  a  matter  of  course  in  the  redefinition  of  all 
  strategic partnerships, special attention should be paid to the balance between values   
  and interests. The obvious priority for the EU will be in its immediate neighbourhood, 
  where the EU is best placed to capitalise upon its ‘power of attraction’. As proximate   
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  neighbours, other states and organisations may also look to the EU for initiative and   
  leadership. But, this must be on the basis of clear values and interests that speak to   
  the younger generations in the southern and eastern neighbourhoods.  The moral and   
  political fortitude of the United States, the key European allies, as well as the EU itself,   
  are likely to be questioned throughout the region.
  The manner in which the EU addresses foment to its south will be critical in defining its   
  wider  global  role.  The  Commission’s  New  response  to  a  changing  Neighbourhood 
  of 25 May 2011 is a step in the right direction, with the promise of greater support   
  to  neighbours  engaged  in  building  ‘deep  democracy’,  more  ‘inclusive  economic   
  development’ and a strengthening of the regional dimension.  The Commission’s new   
  approach is summarised under the rubric ‘more-for-more’ (i.e. the faster a neighbour 
  progresses in its internal reforms, the more EU support will be available). By implication,   
  ‘less-for-less’ also applies. 
  The Union’s role has, however, been hampered by the complicated role of a number   
  of Member States in the region and this is one reason why trade interests have tended   
  to dominate in the EU context. Štefan Füle, Commissioner for Enlargement and ENP,   
  noted that when negotiating and concluding association treaties with these countries   
  and working on the action plan, compromises have been made ‘when the Member   
  States thought that in supporting the authorities we were also supporting stability   
  in these countries.’   The provision of new instruments, such as the Civil Society Facility,   
  the European Endowment for Democracy and support to civil society organisations   
  promoting media freedom are commendable, even if they challenge the notion of   
  ‘joint ownership’ underpinning the EU’s relations with individual neighbours. It will   
  also make relations with the neighbours far more political and, in many cases, difficult   
  (especially among those southern neighbours who have resisted any dialogue on   
  what are perceived pejoratively as ‘western values’). The demonstration by the EU   
  of more overt conditionality in its relations with its neighbours may be of wider benefit   
  to the Union in its relations beyond the neighbourhood since it will send a far clearer   
  message about the type of actor the EU wishes to be on the international scene, as   
  well as the desired balance between interests and values.
  One of the most striking aspects of the Arab spring is the astonishing numbers of   
  youths  under  the  age  of  30  throughout  the  region  (and,  indeed,  even  more  so   
  further south). This clearly suggests that the future of the region rests with young (often   
  unemployed) people. The enticement of eventual deep free trade agreements with the   
  EU ring hollow with many of the unemployed and dispossessed in the region. In order   
  to win back some credibility among the youth in the region the EU will have to   
  demonstrate that it is serious about values and principles, as argued above. This is not   
  an easy sell and it will take time. One additional instrument that should be considered   
  is the establishment of a College of the Mediterranean, bringing together young   
  talented minds from the southern neighbourhood and the Member States, to engage   
  in  graduate  level  studies  in  the  social  sciences,  law  and  public  administration.   
  The aim would be to draw together talent from the region and to establish enduring   
  links across generations of students who, eventually, will become leaders and opinion   
  shapers. This was, after all, the powerful rationale behind the College of Europe and,   
  later on, the Central European University. The obvious locale for such a College would   
  be Malta, historically a gateway to the Arab world. This could be supplemented by   
  active executive development programmes for the region. It is clearly time for the EU   
  to make an important and sustained investment for their futures – and ours. 
Conclusion
The EU is at a juncture where fundamental choices about its future orientation must be 
faced. One fork in the road suggests growing irrelevance, low visibility and the inability to 
shape global change. The other road offers a chance to enhance the EU’s visibility and to 
shape global change, commencing with the neighbourhood. It is an immense challenge, 
but it is also a rare window of opportunity. It was Jacques Poos who, in June 1991, with 
reference to EU’s mediation efforts in Yugoslavia, proclaimed that this was the ‘hour of 
Europe’. This claim met much subsequent ridicule, but he was nevertheless right that 
there will be decisive points where the manner and timing of the EU’s response will shape 
its future. Now is such a time.67
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